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A
O
W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 lbert Einstein famously said “the separation between past, present, and 
future is only an illusion, although a persistent one.”1 Einstein’s non-tem-
poral perspective on the universe has not garnered sufficient traction to 
overcome the temporal mentality ingrained in mainstream physics and social 
thought. The discipline of law is no exception, nor is international law more 
specifically. Time is omnipresent in international law and manifests itself in 
matters as diverse as when treaties enter into force, the occurrence of legally 
relevant facts, the temporal scope of a given rule of international law, and 
the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals, to name only a few examples. 
In the law of armed conflict, one such quintessential matter is the ap-
plicability of the law. Due to international law’s binary distinction between a 
time of “peace” and a time of “war,” or—in modern terms, “armed con-
flict”—the applicability of the law of armed conflict is chiefly concerned with 
the question of when, if at all, an armed conflict has come into existence. An 
answer to that question will largely determine whether the law of armed con-
flict applies. Further, that determination is the entry point for virtually all 
subsequent legal analysis pertaining to the law of armed conflict. 
It therefore comes as no surprise that much attention has been paid to 
the development of analytical parameters for answering that question. In-
deed, as far as the notion of an “armed conflict not of an international char-
acter” (NIAC) is concerned, an abundance of case law and literature has 
filled much of the initial void left by an absence of a clear definition in inter-
national treaty law.2 And here, the “organization” of the non-State armed 
group and the “intensity” of the violence between it and its opponent(s) have 
emerged as the two key criteria. 
While it is beyond dispute that these criteria and their refinement have 
served to lift the fog of law in some important respects, several aspects of 
the temporal scope of the law of NIAC remain unsettled. This articles ad-
dresses three of them. Accordingly, Part II briefly recounts the evolution of 
organization and intensity, while Part III critically examines the assertion that 
                                                                                                                      
1. Letter from Albert Einstein to Vero Besso and Bice (Beatrice) Besso (Mar. 21, 1955) 
(Archival Call Number 7-245) (on file with Einstein Archives Online) (“Für uns gläubige 
Physiker hat die Scheidung zwischen Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft nur die 
Bedeutung einer, wenn auch hartnäckigen, Illusion.”) (translation by author). 
2. Noting of course, the NIAC definition found in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol 
II. See infra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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the factors for ascertaining organization and intensity that have evolved in 
the jurisprudence of international criminal courts and tribunals are indicative 
rather than constitutive (determinative). In turn, this raises two important 
questions addressed in Parts IV and V. Part IV asks to whom the criterion 
of organization is to be applied, while Part V examines whether the requisite 
level of intensity of armed violence can be cumulative when multiple orga-
nized armed groups are pitted against each other and government forces. 
This Part also addresses situations where the armed violence that arises in 
the bilateral relations between two opposing parties does not reach the req-
uisite level of intensity. Part VI concludes. 
 
II. THE TADIĆ LEGACY 
 
Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions refers to “an armed 
conflict not of an international character,”3 but the Conventions do not de-
fine this term. The Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions 
does define this term, although it is commonly understood that the notion 
of an armed conflict not of an international character in Common Article 3 
is not coextensive with the AP II definition.4 
The two most significant differences between a Common Article 3 
NIAC and an AP II NIAC is that the latter is more limited in its application 
as it does not apply to NIACs that take place exclusively between non-State 
organized armed groups (as opposed to between State armed forces and 
non-State organized armed groups) and requires a significant degree of ter-
ritorial control of the non-State organized armed group to meet the requisite 
                                                                                                                      
3. See, e.g., Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, 
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 
U.N.T.S. 85. 
4. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 1(1), June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. 
[A]rmed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of . . . [Protocol I] and which take 
place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident 
armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise 
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and con-
certed military operations and to implement . . . Protocol [II]. 
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threshold (i.e., one that enables it to carry out sustained and concerted mili-
tary operations and to implement Protocol II).5 These differences between 
Common Article 3 NIACs and AP II NIACs mean that the former are left 
undefined in the conventional law of armed conflict. 
Several attempts were made to fill the definitional void in relation to 
Common Article 3 NIACs.6 However, it was not until the establishment of 
the two international ad hoc tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda that international judicial bodies addressed the issue. Most notably, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) of-
fered a definition in its 1995 Decision on the Defence Motion for Interloc-
utory Appeal on Jurisdiction in Tadić, namely, that a NIAC is a situation of 
“protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized 
armed groups or between such groups within a State.” 7 Despite the fact that 
the prerequisite of protracted armed violence implies a temporal dimension, 
the subsequent jurisprudence of the ICTY has recoined this prerequisite into 
an intensity requirement.8 The other requirement that has been deduced 
from the Tadić definition is the organization of the non-State armed group. 
The twin criteria of intensity and organization have since been confirmed 
in a line of cases, both at the ICTY and ICTR and in other international and 
domestic courts and tribunals, including the International Criminal Court 
                                                                                                                      
5. For one analysis of the differences between Common Article 3 NIACs and AP II 
NIACs, see Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 601–10 (Sept. 2, 
1998). 
6. For a recount of some of these attempts, see INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE 
RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR 
THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES 
IN THE FIELD ¶¶ 417–21, at 152–53 (2016) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GE-
NEVA CONVENTION]. 
7. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72, Decision on Defence Motion for In-
terlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 
2, 1995). 
8. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 49 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008) (noting that the “criterion of protracted 
armed violence has therefore been interpreted in practice, including by the Tadić Trial Cham-
ber itself, as referring more to the intensity of the armed violence than to its duration”). 
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(ICC).9 These criteria have also been adopted by State’s in their military man-
uals10 and by the ICRC.11 Against this background, it is safe to posit that 
intensity and organization have garnered widespread support and emerged 
as the two minimum requirements for a Common Article 3 NIAC. 
Subsequent jurisprudence has further fleshed out intensity and organiza-
tion. Indeed, both the ICTY and the ICC have developed detailed lists of 
factors for determining whether the criteria of intensity of the violence and 
organization of the non-State armed group are satisfied. 
In Boškoski and Tarčulovski, the ICTY provided several factors for deter-
mining whether the intensity criterion was met. These factors include 
 
the seriousness of attacks and whether there has been an increase in armed 
clashes, the spread of clashes over territory and over a period of time, any 
increase in the number of government forces and mobilisation and the dis-
tribution of weapons among both parties to the conflict, as well as whether 
the conflict has attracted the attention of the United Nations Security 
Council, and whether any resolutions on the matter have been passed. Trial 
Chambers have also taken into account in this respect the number of civil-
ians forced to flee from the combat zones; the type of weapons used, in 
particular the use of heavy weapons, and other military equipment, such as 
                                                                                                                      
9. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment (Mar. 14, 2012); 
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment (Mar. 7, 2014). 
Moreover, an ICC Trial Chamber, noting that Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute refers 
to “protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups or between such groups,” found that “protracted armed conflict” has been inter-
preted to reaffirm the twin criteria of intensity and organization for a non-international 
armed conflict. Prosecutor v. Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment, ¶ 138 (Mar. 
21, 2016) (footnote omitted). When addressing whether “protracted” establishes a separate 
requirement for establishing the existence of a NIAC over and above intensity and organi-
zation, the Trial Chamber found that it did not. 
[T]he concept of “protracted conflict” has not been explicitly defined in the jurisprudence 
of this Court, but has generally been addressed within the framework of assessing the in-
tensity of the conflict. When assessing whether an armed conflict not of an international 
character was protracted, however, different chambers of this Court emphasized the dura-
tion of the violence as a relevant factor. This corresponds to the approach taken by cham-
bers of the ICTY. The Chamber follows this jurisprudence. 
Prosecutor v. Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment, ¶ 139 (Mar. 21, 2016) 
(footnotes omitted). 
10. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 
LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 3.4.2.2 (rev. ed., 2016), UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DE-
FENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 3.3 (2004). 
11. COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 6, at 153–61. 
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tanks and other heavy vehicles; the blocking or besieging of towns and the 
heavy shelling of these towns; the extent of destruction and the number of 
casualties caused by shelling or fighting; the quantity of troops and units 
deployed; existence and change of front lines between the parties; the oc-
cupation of territory, and towns and villages; the deployment of govern-
ment forces to the crisis area; the closure of roads; cease fire orders and 
agreements, and the attempt of representatives from  international organi-
zations to broker and enforce cease fire agreements. At a more systemic 
level, an indicative factor of internal armed conflict is how organs of the 
State, such as the police and military, use force against armed groups.12 
 
Subsequent case law of the ICTY and of the ICC has by and large endorsed 
these factors.13 
For organization, the most detailed list of factors has been provided by 
the ICTY. In Boškoski and Tarčulovski, the Trial Chamber considered these 
factors by separating them into five groups, stating: 
 
In the first group are those factors signaling the presence of a command 
structure, such as the establishment of a general staff or high command, 
which appoints and gives directions to commanders, disseminates internal 
regulations, organises the weapons supply, authorises military action, as-
signs tasks to individuals in the organisation, and issues political statements 
and communiqués, and which is informed by the operational units of all 
developments within the unit’s area of responsibility. Also included in this 
group are factors such as the existence of internal regulations setting out 
the organisation and structure of the armed group; the assignment of an 
official spokesperson; the communication through communiqués report-
ing military actions and operations undertaken by the armed group; the 
existence of headquarters; internal regulations establishing ranks of service-
men and defining duties of commanders and deputy commanders of a unit, 
company, platoon or squad, creating a chain of military hierarchy between 
the various levels of commanders; and the dissemination of internal regu-
lations to the soldiers and  operational units. 
 
                                                                                                                      
12. Prosecutor v. Boškoski & Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 177–78 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008). 
13. See, e.g., Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 49; Katanga, Case No. ICC-
01/04-01/07, Judgment, ¶ 1187; Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶ 538; 
Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment, ¶ 137. 
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Secondly, factors indicating that the group could carry out operations in an 
organized manner have been considered, such as the group’s ability to de-
termine a unified military strategy and to conduct large scale military oper-
ations, the capacity to control territory, whether there is territorial division 
into zones of responsibility in which the respective commanders are re-
sponsible for the establishment of Brigades and other units and appoint 
commanding officers for such units; the capacity of operational units to 
coordinate their actions, and the effective dissemination of written and oral 
orders and decisions. 
 
In the third group are factors indicating a level of logistics have been taken 
into account, such as the ability to recruit new members; the providing of 
military training; the organized supply of military weapons; the supply and 
use of uniforms; and the existence of communications equipment for link-
ing headquarters with units or between units. 
 
In a fourth group, factors relevant to determining whether an armed group 
possessed a level of discipline and the ability to implement the basic obli-
gations of Common Article 3 have been considered, such as the establish-
ment of disciplinary rules and mechanisms; proper training; and the exist-
ence of internal regulations and whether these are effectively disseminated 
to members. 
 
A fifth group includes those factors indicating that the armed group was 
able to speak with one voice, such as its capacity to act on behalf of its 
members in political negotiations with representatives of international or-
ganisations and foreign countries; and its ability to negotiate and conclude 
agreements such as cease fire or peace accords.14 
 
These groupings were acknowledged in ICTY case law that followed Boško-
ski and Tarčulovski,15 as well as the subsequent jurisprudence of the ICC, albeit 
with slight variation.16 And yet, as helpful as these definitional advances are, 
they also raise questions, three of which are examined in the following Parts. 
                                                                                                                      
14. Boškoski & Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 199–203 (footnotes 
omitted). 
15. See, e.g., Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 60. 
16. For example, the Lubanga and Katanga judgments added “the extent, seriousness, 
and intensity of any military involvement” as a factor in determining whether an armed 
group is sufficiently organized. See Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶ 537; 
Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment, ¶ 1186. 
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III. INDICATIVE OR DETERMINATIVE? 
 
Throughout the jurisprudence of the ad hoc criminal tribunals, it is stressed 
that the factors to be considered when assessing intensity and organization 
are “indicative.”17 As stated in Haradinaj, “none of . . . [the factors] are, in 
themselves, essential to establish whether the . . . [organization or intensity] 
criterion is fulfilled.”18 Accordingly, none of the factors are individually de-
terminative and they should be applied “flexibly.”19 
The implication is that, rather than a simple checklist, these factors can, 
but need not necessarily be present, cumulatively or individually, before con-
cluding a NIAC exists and the law of NIAC applies. Such an assertion re-
flects an acute awareness by the various tribunals that have addressed the 
issue that the application of an abstract definition of the factual situation of 
a NIAC, which centers on the two cumulative requirements of organization 
and intensity and their further refinement through a list of factors, is—far 
from surprisingly—a context-specific exercise. The factors are, to put it dif-
ferently, providing an open-ended and non-limitative framework for making 
the case for or against the existence of a NIAC. Depending on the mandate 
and agenda of the actor that is making the determination—a State’s armed 
forces, non-State armed groups, humanitarian and civil society organizations, 
judges in domestic or international courts and tribunals, prosecutors, defense 
lawyers, and so on—the conclusions reached may differ, while the conver-
sation about how these conclusions have been reached will at least partly be 
informed by the factors that the ad hoc tribunals have developed. With that 
caveat in mind, the guidance that emanates from the list of factors should 
not be overstated. They have not produced a situation in which the fog of 
the law of NIAC has been lifted and the determination of the existence of a 
NIAC has become an exercise of surgical precision. 
It appears doubtful, however, that all factors produced in the jurispru-
dence by the ad hoc tribunals are no more than indicative. Indeed, some of 
their findings seem to contradict this sweeping assertion and suggest a more 
nuanced approach, where a distinction can be made between merely indica-
tive factors and determinative factors whose absence ipso facto defeats the 
existence of a NIAC. As regards the latter, the one factor without which one 
cannot reasonably conclude that an armed group is sufficiently organized is 
that it displays some form of a command structure and, as an expression of 
                                                                                                                      
17. Boškoski & Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 176. 
18. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 49, 60. 
19. See, e.g., Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶ 537. 
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such a command structure, disciplinary rules and mechanisms within the 
group. The ICTY put it as follows: “[F]or an armed group to be considered 
organised, it would need to have some hierarchical structure and its leader-
ship requires the capacity to exert authority over its members.”20 This is not 
to suggest that an armed group must display a command structure that re-
sembles that of State armed forces. Rather, what is required is that the armed 
group is organized in a way that allows individual members (superiors) to 
command, and exert authority over, other individual members (subordi-
nates). Thus understood, a command structure is cause and consequence for 
the violence to be of a collective nature, which in turn merits the description 
of a NIAC, provided the intensity requirement is met. What is more, to per-
ceive of a command structure as a determinative factor in assessing the req-
uisite level of organization acknowledges it as a precondition for a group’s 
ability to ensure compliance with the law of NIAC, as it implies existing rules 
and disciplinary mechanisms.21 
As far as intensity is concerned, one can distill the essence that the armed 
violence leads to the loss of life, injury, and destruction, or damage of ob-
jects, while taking the form of “fighting”— understood as armed confronta-
tions of a military nature—between opposing parties. While this is not to 
suggest that one-sided armed violence—for instance, the killing of civilians 
or destruction of civilian objects—cannot also feature in the intensity analy-
sis for determining the existence of a NIAC, fighting between the parties is 
a quintessential precondition, and as such, a determinative factor. 
Understood as such, the determinative factors of a command structure 
and fighting between the parties are closely intertwined and mutually condi-
tioned. Without the armed group having a command structure, it is impos-
sible to issue orders and exercise control over armed forces, hence, to direct 
them and their operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. It 
is impossible, in short, to project armed violence that is military in nature. 
While the foregoing suggests that one can discern a distinction between 
determinative and indicative factors when examining intensity and organiza-
tion, the two constitutive criteria raise further questions. For example, con-
cerning organization, a key question is to whom the concept applies. In other 
                                                                                                                      
20. Boškoski & Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 195. 
21. On the role of a command structure, “responsible command,” and the two ration-
ales for requiring organization, namely, that the violence is of a collective nature and that a 
group is able to comply with the law of NIAC, see SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF 
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 174–80 (2012). 
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words, who or what needs to be organized? In relation to intensity, an im-
portant question is whether the requisite level of intensity can be accumu-
lated by several actors. These questions are addressed below. 
 
IV. TO WHOM DOES THE REQUIREMENT OF “ORGANIZATION” APPLY? 
 
Organization is commonly assessed only in relation to the non-State actor in 
question. State armed forces, on the other hand, are presumed to satisfy the 
requisite level of organization.22 Yet, it seems to be more befitting of the 
factual situation of a NIAC to consider that presumption to be rebuttable 
and to apply the criterion of organization to State armed forces. As a conse-
quence, a NIAC does not come about if a State’s armed force only exists 
nominally, but does not display the requisite level of organization, even 
though the opposing non-State armed group might. Likewise, the loss of the 
requisite level of organization of State armed forces in the course of a NIAC 
should be treated in the same way as such a loss by a non-State armed group 
when determining whether the NIAC has come to an end and the law of 
NIAC ceases to apply. 
Another dimension of the “to whom” question is to identify precisely 
what needs to be organized. The generic definition in Tadić suggests that the 
criterion applies to an “armed group.”23 This is confirmed by subsequent 
jurisprudence that assesses the factors for organization in relation to an 
armed group.24 At other times, the criterion is considered in relation to “the 
parties to the conflict.”25 A third approach is to apply the criterion to the 
                                                                                                                      
22. In this regard, see, for example, Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 60. 
See also COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 6, ¶ 156, at 429. 
23. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70. 
24. See, e.g., Boškoski & Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 199–203. 
25. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 562 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997); see also Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-
66-T, Judgment, ¶ 84 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005); Boškoski 
& Tarčulovski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 175; Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 
Judgment, ¶ 620; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment and Sentence, 
¶ 93 (Dec. 6, 1999). 
See also Lubanga, where the Trial Chamber noted, “Some of these armed conflicts [in 
Ituri and in surrounding areas within the DRC] which included the UPC [Union des Patriotes 
Congolais], involved protracted violence.” Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, 
¶ 543. The Trial Chamber then identified the FPLC [Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du 
Congo] as “the military wing” of the UPC, subsequently referring to the UPC/FPLC “as a 
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armed forces of such a party.26 Admittedly, disentangling non-State party, 
armed group, and armed forces is very difficult, if not impossible, in many 
contemporary NIACs. This notably holds true in all cases where the party to 
the armed conflict is the armed force of an armed group and there is no 
distinguishable element of the party to the armed conflict that is not (also) 
part of the command structure of the military organization. Indeed, the ter-
minological imprecision in the case law and literature may, at least in part, be 
symptomatic of the lack of distinguishability in many cases. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that the three terms cannot be distinguished on a 
conceptual level. 
In the law of international armed conflict, “a party to the conflict” and 
“armed forces” are clearly distinct concepts.27 The former refers to the po-
litical entity in its entirety, that is, the State, whereas the latter refers to the 
State’s military forces.28 To draw an analogy from the law of international 
armed conflict, the term “party to the conflict” in a NIAC could be broader 
than the term “armed forces,” as the former refers to the entire political en-
tity, such as an opposition movement that comprises a political and military 
wing. In contrast, “armed forces” would refer only to the military wing that 
projects force on behalf of the political wing. 
                                                                                                                      
political and military organization” that was in control of Bunia. Id. ¶¶ 27, 543 (footnotes 
omitted). The Trial Chamber then seemed to apply the organizational criterion to the 
UPC/FPLC, noting that “[t]he UPC/FPLC was organised with a leadership structure that 
was capable of training troops as well as imposing discipline, and it carried out sustained 
military operations in Ituri during the relevant timeframe.” Id. ¶ 543 (footnotes omitted); see 
also International Committee of the Red Cross, How Is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in 
International Humanitarian Law? 5 (International Committee of the Red Cross, Opinion Paper, 
2008), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf 
(stating “the parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum of organisation”). 
26. International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 25, at 3 (noting “non-gov-
ernmental groups involved in the conflict must be considered as ‘parties to the conflict,’ 
meaning that they possess organized armed forces”); COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVEN-
TION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE 
ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 49 (Jean Pictet ed., 1952) (“That the Party in revolt against 
the de jure Government possesses an organized military force.”). 
27. See, e.g., Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field arts. 13(1)–(2), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 
U.N.T.S. 31; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 4A(1)–
(2), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
28. Cf. COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION, supra note 6, ¶ 1452, at 
520 (using the phase “all military personnel”). 
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It is less clear where the concept “organized armed group” sits in relation 
to these two concepts. AP II can be read to mean that it comprises non-State 
armed forces, since Article 1(1) identifies “dissident armed forces” as a sub-
category of “organized armed groups” that in turn are “under responsible 
command” and “exercise such control over a part of [a State’s] territory as 
to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and 
to implement [AP II].”29 Similarly, the Tadić definition of a NIAC suggests 
that organized armed groups are those engaged in protracted armed violence 
against governmental forces (or other organized armed groups). The forego-
ing suggests that the concepts “organized armed groups” and “non-State 
armed forces” are largely interchangeable, but clearly distinguishable from 
the concept of a non-State “party to the conflict,” with the former two re-
ferring to the organized fighting force of the latter. For the purposes of ex-
amining the organization of non-State actors, it means that the relevant ob-
ject of analysis is the armed group/non-State armed force, rather than the 
party to the conflict. 
 
V. CUMULATIVE INTENSITY 
 
Several of the cases that were instrumental in developing the criteria of or-
ganization and intensity were concerned with situations in which both had 
to be assessed vis-à-vis one armed group and vis-à-vis the violence that oc-
curred in the bilateral relationship between that group and governmental au-
thorities. Yet, there are a number of situations involving multiple armed 
groups and the government that could qualify as a NIAC. Examples include 
the situation in Syria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Libya, 
and Colombia. In cases such as these, several organized armed groups fight 
against governmental authorities and against each other, or they confront a 
common enemy but operate independently and individually, or they forge 
fragile alliances that later collapse. One of the questions that arise in such 
contexts is whether the requisite level of intensity can be met cumulatively 
by the actions of more than one organized armed group that act inde-
pendently against governmental authorities or against each other, even 
though the actions of each one of them in their respective bilateral relations, 
taken in isolation, do not reach that threshold. An answer to that question is 
highly significant for the temporal scope of the law of NIAC. If one were to 
require intensity in the bilateral relations between armed force A and armed 
                                                                                                                      
29. Additional Protocol II, supra note 4, art. 1(1). 
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force B, armed force A and armed force C, armed force B and armed force 
C and so on, it would mean that several NIACs may come into existence at 
different points in times. In contrast, a cumulative approach to assessing in-
tensity would mean that a single NIAC begins once the requisite level of in-
tensity of the violence caused by all armed forces is reached. 
The jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals is somewhat am-
bivalent on the issue. In the armed conflict in eastern DRC—a situation that 
is perhaps at the extreme end of complexity regarding actors, with at times 
as many as seventy armed groups being reported to have been active30—an 
ICC Trial Chamber found in Lubanga that “there were a number of simulta-
neous armed conflicts in Ituri and in surrounding areas within the DRC, in-
volving various different groups.”31 The Trial Chamber also found that some 
of these armed conflicts “involved protracted violence.”32 While this word-
ing may appear circular, as reference is made to armed conflicts that “in-
volved protracted violence,” whereas armed conflicts, at least those of a non-
international character, presuppose intensity (or in the words of the Trial 
Chamber, “protractedness”) of the violence, the Trial Chamber seems to 
suggest that intensity is to be assessed in each of the various armed conflicts 
simultaneously. 
The same approach seems to underlie the subsequent analysis by the 
Trial Chamber of an increase in the “‘rapidity of the alliance switches,’ the 
‘multi-directionality’ of the fighting and the nature of the violence against the 
civilian population.”33 Here, the Trial Chamber examined some of the armed 
groups opposing the FPLC (Force Patriotique pour la Liberation du Congo), the 
military wing of the UPC. These groups included the APC (Armee Populaire 
Congolaise), the armed wing of the RCD-ML (Rassemblement Congolais pour la 
Democratie – Kisangani/Mouvement de Liberation), and a number of Lendu mili-
tias.34 It also considered the nature of the violence in which they were in-
volved, including where and when it occurred.35 The Trial Chamber then 
concluded “that the UPC/FPLC, as an armed force or group, participated 
                                                                                                                      
30. See JASON K. STEARNS & CHRISTOPH VOGEL, CONGO RESEARCH GROUP, THE 
LANDSCAPE OF ARMED GROUPS IN THE EASTERN CONGO 5 (2015), http://congore-
searchgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/The-Landscape-of-Armed-Groups-in-
Eastern-Congo1.pdf. 
31. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶ 543. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. ¶ 544–47. 
34. Id. ¶ 548. 
35. Id. 
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in protracted hostilities and was associated with an armed conflict through-
out the relevant timeframe of the charges.”36 This choice of words adds to 
the confusion, as it refers to “armed conflict” in the singular. 
However, in Katanga, a different Trial Chamber employed a more global 
assessment of intensity to the same situation in eastern DRC. That Trial 
Chamber examined whether, and to what extent, armed groups that were 
active in Ituri, including the UPC, the APC, and the Ngiti militia/FRPI (Force 
de Résistance Patriotique d’Ituri) satisfied the organizational requirement.37 The 
Trial Chamber also assessed the involvement of other States in the vio-
lence.38 It then turned to intensity and noted that the parties “accepted that 
the fighting, inter alia, between the Ngiti militia and the UPC, was part of a 
cycle of violence that extended far beyond isolated acts falling outwith inter-
national humanitarian law.”39 The words “inter alia” are significant, in as 
much as fighting between other groups does not seem to be categorically 
excluded from the Trial Chamber’s assessment of intensity. The following 
statement by the Trial Chamber supports this conclusion: 
 
With specific reference to its foregoing review of the attacks that followed 
[the] assault on Bogoro, the Chamber finds that the armed conflict was 
both protracted and intense owing, inter alia, to its duration and the volume 
of attacks perpetrated throughout the territory of Ituri from January 2002 
to May 2003. Thus, in the Chamber’s view, the evidence before it suffices 
to fulfil the intensity of the conflict requirement.40 
 
Here, the court found that the “attacks that followed [the] assault on 
Bogoro” included those conducted by Lendu militias41 and Ngiti and Lendu 
combatants42 against a Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces (UPDF) base, and 
an attack by the Biva of Andisoma collectivité, with  UPDF and Hema support,  
on the Ngiti and Lendu of Nyskunde village.43 In determining whether the 
intensity criterion was fulfilled, the Trial Chamber drew on these attacks cu-
mulatively within the referenced territorial (Ituri) and temporal (January 2002 
                                                                                                                      
36. Id. ¶ 550. 
37. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment, ¶¶ 1207–11. 
38. Id. ¶¶ 1212–15. 
39. Id. ¶ 1216. 
40. Id. ¶ 1217 (footnotes omitted). 
41. Id. ¶ 464. 
42. Id. ¶ 466. 
43. Id. ¶ 467. 
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to May 2003) confines. It refrained from disentangling the level of violence 
that the bilateral confrontations between individual opponent groups en-
tailed. Instead it shifted its focus to a specified area and period. 
At times, the ICRC follows a similar approach in complex situations. 
Thus, in relation to Syria, the ICRC concluded that a NIAC had come into 
existence because fighting occurred between “Government Forces and a 
number of organised armed opposition groups operating in several parts of 
the country (including, but not limited to, Homs, Idlib and Hama),”44 but 
without delving into the issues of whether, when, and where the bilateral 
violence between government forces and individual organized armed 
groups, or violence between such groups, reached the requisite level of in-
tensity. A more global, cumulative approach to intensity is also echoed in the 
practice of a number of bodies45 and in legal scholarship that addressed the 
questions of whether and when a NIAC had come into existence in Syria.46 
It is submitted that there are good grounds for applying a cumulative 
approach to the determination of whether the requisite level of intensity has 
been met in complex situations such as the ones in eastern DRC or Syria. 
Where a situation of violence in a given area during a given period is charac-
terized by a high fluctuation in the number and strength of organized armed 
groups, including shifting alliances, hastily assembled coalitions, and their 
break-up, a bilateral approach runs the risk of defeating the purpose of the 
law of armed conflict: to ensure a proper balance between considerations of 
military necessity and humanity. As such, the law is fact-driven and designed 
to apply only in situations that involve the requisite level of violence. The 
necessity—both in military and humanitarian terms—for the law of armed 
conflict to govern a given situation does not depend on the question of 
whether the violence between two parties in their bilateral relationship 
reaches the required threshold or whether that violence occurs between sev-
eral opposing parties in their mutual relations. If the accumulation of death, 
                                                                                                                      
44. Syria: ICRC and Syrian Arab Red Crescent Maintain Aid Effort amid Increased Fighting, 
ICRC (July 17, 2012), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/update/2012/ 
syria-update-2012-07-17.htm. 
45. For a consideration of relevant practice, see Christopher Phillips, Syria, in LOUISE 
ARIMATSU & MOHBUBA CHOUDHURY, CHATHAM HOUSE, THE LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF 
THE ARMED CONFLICTS IN SYRIA, YEMEN AND LIBYA 7–19 (2014), https://www.chatham-
house.org/sites/default/files/home/chatham/public_html/sites/default/files/20140300 
ClassificationConflictsArimatsuChoudhury1.pdf. 
46. See Terry D. Gill, Classifying the Conflict in Syria, 92 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 
353, 375 (2016). 
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injury, and destruction caused by several organized armed groups and gov-
ernmental authorities is such that it can reasonably be described as “suffi-
ciently intense,”47 victims in that situation should not be deprived of the pro-
tection accorded by the law of armed conflict merely because the violence 
that characterizes the bilateral relations between any two of its authors stays 
below the requisite level of intensity. Nor should parties to such a situation 
be deprived of the rights, privileges, and authorizations that the law provides 
to allow them to submit their opponents. 
The problematic consequence of bilateralizing intensity would be that 
sporadic acts of violence by one organized armed group (party A) against 
another organized armed group or governmental authorities (party B), which 
is also involved in a pre-existing NIAC against a third organized armed group 
or governmental authorities (party C) in the same geographical area and dur-
ing the same period, would fall outside the ambit of the law of NIAC. This 
would give rise to a significant regulatory void, particularly in light of the 
controversies surrounding the applicability of human rights law to organized 
armed groups.48 Furthermore, to bilateralize intensity would entail that the 
disappearance of the requisite level of violence in the bilateral relation be-
tween party B and party C could entail that the NIAC between the two 
comes to an end, whereas the co-existing (in geographical and temporal 
terms) bilateral NIAC between either party and a fourth party (party D) con-
tinues for as long as the requisite level of intensity is reached in their bilateral 
relations. After such a cessation of intense violence, sporadic acts of violence 
between party B and party C would thus fall outside the regulatory ambit of 
the law of NIAC in a factual situation that remains a NIAC between party B 
and party D as well as a NIAC between party C and party D. 
While complex situations of violence may justify a cumulative approach 
to assessing intensity, such an approach entails significant risks if applied 
routinely to all situations of violence in which organized armed groups are 
involved. Taken to its extreme, such an approach could be misunderstood 
to allow for the determination that a NIAC has come into existence because 
                                                                                                                      
47. For a review of ICTY jurisprudence describing the level of violence between two 
parties as sufficiently intense, see Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 41, 45, 47– 
48. 
48. See, e.g., Yaël Ronen, Human Rights Obligations of Territorial Non-State Actors, 46 COR-
NELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 21 (2013); Tilman Rodenhäuser, International Legal 
Obligations of Armed Opposition Groups in Syria, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW 3–7 (2015); 
SIVAKUMARAN, supra  note 21, at 95–99. 
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sporadic acts of violence of one or several organized armed groups that oc-
cur over an extended period of time and across a wide geographical area 
satisfy the requisite level of intensity. Such an unrestrained accumulation of 
intensity would result in a situation similar to the much-criticized over-appli-
cation of the law of armed conflict that characterizes the “Global War on 
Terror.”49 There, clearly distinct terrorist acts separable in temporal and ge-
ographical terms were lumped together and elevated to an armed conflict to 
justify responses within a conduct of hostilities paradigm, rather than law 
enforcement measures governed by applicable human rights law. 
In order to avoid the risks of over-application, a cumulative approach to 
assessing intensity has to be applied in a nuanced and careful fashion. In 
practice, this would mean that it is only to be applied in complex situations 
where acts of violence by several organized armed groups occur on a geo-
graphical and temporal continuum. That continuum serves the purpose of 
distinguishing acts of violence that are reasonably grouped together because 
they occur in an identifiable location and within sufficient temporal proxim-
ity of one another from a loose series of acts of violence by different orga-
nized armed groups that occur over a wide geographical area (perhaps even 
in several non-adjacent States). While the exact contours of the suggested 
geographical and temporal continuum will be context-specific, the analysis 
of the ICC Trial Chamber in Katanga50 may be indicative of how this ap-
proach can be applied. Ultimately, the legitimacy of the suggested approach 
that allows for cumulative intensity will depend on a good faith application 
centered on the exigencies of the factual situation as requiring—in both hu-
manitarian and military terms—the application of the law of NIAC. 
 
                                                                                                                      
49. The George W. Bush administration adopted the phrase “Global War on Terror” 
soon after the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States.  In an address to Con-
gress on September 20, 2001, President Bush stated, “Our war on terror . . . will not end 
until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” Address 
Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist At-
tacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1347, 1348 (Sept. 20, 2001). The use 
of the phrase ceased under the Obama administration. See, e.g., Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, 
“Global War on Terror” Is Given a New Name, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 25, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR20090324028 
18.html. 
For an analysis of the substantial legal criticism of the Global War on Terror, see Mary 
Ellen O’Connell, The Legal Case Against the Global War on Terror, 36 CASE WESTERN RESERVE 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 349 (2004). 
50. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment, ¶¶ 464–67. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
While intensity and organization have evolved to become the undisputed 
criteria for determining the temporal scope of the law of NIAC, their exact 
contours remain somewhat uncertain. Yet, the following conclusions can be 
drawn. First, the assertion that the factors that have been developed in order 
to assess whether the requisite levels of intensity and organization are met 
are merely indicative does not hold true for all these factors. Rather, one can 
discern determinative factors that condition the existence of a NIAC. For an 
armed group to be considered “organized,” it needs to possess a command 
structure and, as an expression of such a command structure, disciplinary 
rules and mechanisms within the group. For the violence to be “intense,” it 
needs to involve the loss of life, injury, destruction, or damage of objects in 
the form of “fighting” between opposing parties. Second, the criterion of 
organization applies equally to the armed forces of States and non-State ac-
tors, rather than to them as “party” to a NIAC. Third, in complex situations 
where several organized armed groups and State armed forces are pitted 
against each other, the requisite level of intensity can be met by an accumu-
lation of violence that arises between all such actors, provided that the vio-
lence occurs on a temporal and geographical continuum. 
These three findings lift the fog surrounding the temporal scope of the 
law of NIAC to some extent in as much as they assist in further refining the 
framework for analyzing the facts. At the same time, it may be useful to 
remind ourselves of the fluidity of the concept of time, which is situated 
somewhere between the precision of an atomic clock and Einstein’s asser-
tion that it is an illusion. Time also remains somewhat indeterminate in the 
context of the temporal scope of the law of NIAC. The assessment as to 
whether the degree of organization and intensity are such to trigger the ap-
plicability of the law of NIAC will not be free of subjectivity. It remains a 
context-specific exercise that reflects the perspective, bias, and agenda of the 
person or institution engaged in making the assessment. As such, a high de-
gree of objective precision when determining the temporal scope of the law 
of NIAC is perhaps as much an illusion as the concept of time according to 
Einstein. 
 
